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In 2016, there were 152 complaints made relating to police shootings and deaths. This is a 
problem insofar as there are two bodies that are tasked with police oversight in Kenya. This 
study was aimed at finding out why this is the case. This is because with two oversight bodies 
and a robust legal framework, it would be expected that the number of extrajudicial killings 
should have reduced. This study will also look at whether there are any weaknesses with the 
current oversight system in comparison with the previous system in order to establish what 
needs to be improved. 
This study has been conducted through the literature review of legislation in Kenya that 
provides for police oversight as well as reports which show what has been happening on the 
ground. It has established that there are various challenges posed to police oversight over 
extrajudicial killings. These are the failure of accountability, investigation and proper law 
enforcement; the widespread nature of extrajudicial killings and police involvement in the 
extrajudicial killings; inadequate mandate and resources and improper co-ordination of internal 
and external oversight mechanisms. This has led to the oversight mechanisms being inadequate 
despite the existence of an extensive legal regime. 
This study proposes that IAU be given a clear mandate as well as IPOA being given 
prosecutorial powers in order for these mechanisms to adequately discharge of their mandate 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Before 2010, the police force in Kenya had a structure that had two main arms, the Kenya 
Police Service and the Administrative Police Service. The two units continued to be directly 
under the control of the President.1 At that point in time, it is clear that there was no police 
oversight mechanism provided for in the law. On 8th May 2009, President Kibaki announced 
the appointment of a National Task Force on Police Reform and set out its terms of reference 
in The Kenya Gazette No. 4790 of 8th May, 2009.2 This included special focus being given to 
recommendations on, among other things, the restructuring of the Police Force and the 
establishment of the Independent Police Oversight Authority.3 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 gave life to the recommendations that were given by the 
National Task Force on Police Reform. It brought about a single command structure, under the 
Inspector-General of Police. Two institutions which were tasked with police oversight were 
established, one, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA or, ‘Authority’) which 
was established under the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act and two, the Internal 
Affairs Unit (IAU) which was established pursuant to Section 87 of the National Police Service 
Act. The mandate of the IAU includes, but is not limited to, receiving and investigating 
complaints against the police. The Unit shall investigate misconduct and hear complaints from 
members of the Service or members of the public; at the direction of a senior officer; on its 
own initiative; or on the direction of the Inspector-General; or at the request of the Independent 
Police Oversight Authority.4 The Act also provides that any use of force or firearms leading to 
death, it ought to be reported by the officer in charge or another direct superior of the person 
who caused the death, to the Authority who shall investigate the case.5 
Article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 requires the police to strive for the highest 
standards of professionalism and discipline among its members and prevent corruption and 
                                                          
1 Amnesty International, Police reform in Kenya: ‘A drop in the ocean’, 2013, 17. 
2 National Task Force on Police Reform, Report of the national task force on police reforms (hereafter the Ransley 
Task Force Report), 2009, 3. 
3 Ransley Task Force Report, 80. 
4 Section 87(4), National Police Service Act (Act No. 11A of 2011). 




promote and practice transparency and accountability while carrying out their duties.6 This 
shows that the accountability of the police is a constitutional requirement and since the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, police accountability has to be ensured. IPOA was 
established to provide for civilian oversight of the work of the police, with some of its 
objectives being to give effect to Article 244 and to ensure independent oversight of the 
handling of complaints by the Service.7 
Moreover, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 brought about a robust human rights framework 
which applies to all law and binds all state organs and persons.8 This includes the right to life 
which should not intentionally be taken from any person except to the extent authorised by the 
Constitution or other written law.9 Any killing that falls outside what is allowed by the law 
would be classified as an extrajudicial killing. This human rights framework bestows upon the 
state the obligation to protect its citizens in situations where their rights are violated and to 
allow them to enforce their rights. All these provisions show why police accountability and 
oversight is necessary in Kenya. There is a broad legal framework that makes oversight 
possible. 
The investigation of extrajudicial killings would fall within the mandate of the Authority, as 
well as that of the Internal Affairs Unit. Failures in the criminal justice system, and in internal 
and external police accountability mechanisms, encourage the commission of unlawful killings 
by police.10 In Kenya, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights abuses by 
members of a state’s police force have been an issue of concern following a visit by the Special 
Rapporteur.11 
A report by the Independent Medico-Legal Unit documented thirty-four cases of extrajudicial 
killings in 2014 and twenty-seven in 2015.12 These numbers are high, despite the slight 
                                                          
6 Article 244, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
7 Section 5, Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (Act No. 35 of 2011). 
8 Article 20(1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
9 Article 26(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
10 Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 26 May 
2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, para. 22. 
11 Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 28 May 
2010, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.8, para. 7. 





decrease in those two years. More recently, there was the death of Willie Kimani. He 
disappeared after lodging a complaint against a police officer on behalf of a client, who was 
also killed, along with their driver. The Law Society of Kenya called on all lawyers to boycott 
courts with nationwide protests have been organised.13 It is this public outcry that can be seen 
to have led to the investigation of the same, with the police officers who are suspected to have 
killed the three individuals being taken to Court, not the use of the oversight mechanisms which 
have been set up to deal with holding the police accountable for such cases. 
Furthermore, in the Revised Police Reforms Program Document (2015-2018), it is stated that 
at that point, a total of 3246 complaints against police actions were received during the review 
period, of which 147 investigation cases were finalized out of which 14 of these were submitted 
to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 4 recommended for prosecution.14 This 
shows that there are very few matters that end up being finalized, in as much as there have 
been complaints that have been investigated. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
The problem is that even with the existence of both internal and external oversight 
mechanisms, extrajudicial killings in Kenya are rampant. This would in turn mean that the 
oversight mechanisms provided for by the law are not adequately addressing their mandate as 
the police are not being held accountable for extrajudicial killings: that they are not effective. 
Important obstacles to external mechanism effectiveness often arise after it has completed its 
investigation.15 Even where their investigations found strong evidence of police wrongdoing, 
that is as far as their powers go, as they can only give recommendations to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) to prosecute a matter. The ability to fully investigate and report on 
incidents and complaints, even with complete independence, means little if the authority lacks 
the capacity to ensure that the police, prosecutors and/or executive act on the basis of their 
                                                          
13 ‘Kenyan police in court over lawyer Willie Kimani's death’ BBC News, 4 July 2016 —
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36703271> on 18 December 2017. 
14 Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, Revised police reforms program document 
(2015-2018), August 2015, 11. 
15 Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 28 May 




findings.16 This brings up the aspect of the oversight body having prosecutorial powers in order 
to effectively discharge its mandate in relation to extrajudicial killings. 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
This study is justified by the fact that there has been little or no change in the occurrence of 
extrajudicial killings since the IAU and IPOA were established. This means that the Kenyan 
system should be changed in order to ensure that the mandate of the existent oversight bodies 
is discharged well, leading to a decrease in the number of extrajudicial killings, as there would 
be a high standard of police accountability. With the oversight mechanisms playing a 
complementary role to the existent criminal justice system, in this case, in order to bring 
suspects of extrajudicial killings to be held liable for their acts, there should also be a reflection 
of the same in the number of cases that are reported. The process should not end at the oversight 
agencies giving the DPP a recommendation to further the investigation of such matters because 
the power of the DPP is a discretionary power. 
1.4 Statement of Research Objective(s) 
The specific objectives of this research are: 
1. To analyse the system of investigation of extrajudicial killings prior and subsequent to 
the police reform. 
2. To show the international and domestic standards that are required for police 
accountability. 
3. To determine whether or not there are any weaknesses and improvements in the 
investigation of extrajudicial killings with a new system having been put in place. 
4. To show the importance of a well-established civilian oversight system in the 
investigation of extrajudicial killings. 
5. To suggest ways of improving police investigative systems with regard to extrajudicial 
killings to ensure effectiveness. 
                                                          
16 Report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, 28 May 




1.5 Research Questions 
The paper will examine the following research questions: 
1. Does the failure of accountability, investigation and proper law enforcement lead to 
extrajudicial killings? 
2. Does the widespread nature of extrajudicial killings and the involvement of the police 
in investigation hinder the investigative process? 
3. Does the mandate given to and mechanisms used by the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority adequately address extrajudicial killings? 
4. Would enhanced co-ordination of internal and external oversight mechanisms help in 
improving investigation of extrajudicial killings? 
1.6 Hypothesis 
This research is conducted on the premise that the legal framework and the institutions that are 
tasked with oversight over the police are weak and the current police oversight system needs 
to be improved in order to adequately address valid complaints over extrajudicial killings. 
It relies on the presumption that the complaints that are made to the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority are genuine. 
1.7 Research Design and Methodology 
This study will be conducted through qualitative desktop research. This will involve looking 
at reports and studies that have been done regarding the issue of extrajudicial killings as well 
as police oversight in Kenya. The research rely on the data that has been provided by IPOA 
instead of conducting field research to get raw data on the number of extrajudicial killings that 
have been perpetrated. 
1.8 Limitations 
In looking at the history and investigation of extrajudicial killings before 2010, this study will 
be limited to events between 2007 and 2010. Another limitation is that there are no decided 




1.9 Chapter Breakdown 
This research paper will consist of six chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This will be the introduction to the study which will provide an overview of the entire paper. 
It will include the background and justification of the study, the statement of the problem, 
research questions and objectives of the study. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
This will look at the theoretical framework, expounding on the theories that form the basis of 
this study. The study is founded on two theories, the social contract theory and the deterrence 
theory. 
Chapter 3: Legal Framework in Kenya Governing Police Oversight 
This will be an analysis of the existing legal framework for police oversight, both constitutional 
and statutory, also looking at the institutions that are established by the law to facilitate police 
oversight. The laws that are looked at are the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, the National Police 
Service Act and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act. 
Chapter 4: History of Extrajudicial Killings and their Investigation in Kenya 
This will cover the history of extrajudicial killings, in relation to their oversight before the 
police reforms as well as analysing the fact of extrajudicial killings after the 2009 police 
reforms and the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings 
This will be an analysis of the findings of the previous chapter to show the challenges that have 
been faced in the oversight of police, particularly in relation to extrajudicial killings. It will be 
important so as to show why Kenya needs to improve its oversight mechanisms which will in 





Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This will give a conclusion on the issue of police oversight over extrajudicial killings as well 
as recommendations to improve the established oversight mechanisms same with regard to the 






CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the theoretical framework that forms the basis of this study. This 
study is founded on two theories, the social contract theory and the deterrence theory. I will 
also look at the normative human rights framework, both internationally and regionally. 
2.2 Social Contract Theory 
The social contract theory has various proponents, the main ones being Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For Thomas Hobbes, the social contract is a phenomenon 
whereby, given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to 
submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is 
conducive to their own interests.17 According to him, before the social contract, man lived in 
a state of nature which was one of fear and selfishness. In other words, life in the state of nature 
was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.18 In order for him to secure self-protection and 
preservation, as well as avoiding misery and pain, man entered into a contract.19 As a result of 
this contract, the mightiest authority is to protect and preserve their lives and property.20 
For John Locke, he used the claim that men are naturally free and equal as part of the 
justification for understanding legitimate political government as the result of a social contract 
where people in the state of nature conditionally transfer some of their rights to the government 
in order to better ensure the stable, comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty, and property.21 
In his idea of the social contract, the state of nature was not as miserable as the one expressed 
by Thomas Hobbes. His description of the state of nature is free of Hobbes’ ‘force and fraud’, 
with men instead living together according to reason but lacking a guiding authority to 
                                                          
17 Friend C ‘Social contract theory’ Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, —<http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-
cont/#SH2a> on 2 September 2017. 
18 Hobbes T, Leviathan, 2nd ed, Dent, London, 1937, 83. 
19 Laskar M, ‘Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’ (hereafter ‘Summary of the 
social contract by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’) Published LLM Thesis, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, 2013, 1. 
20 Laskar M, ‘Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’, 2. 
21 Tuckness A ‘Locke’s political philosophy’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 11 May 2016 —




follow.22 Under the social contract, man surrendered some of his rights, which were the rights 
to preserve/maintain order and enforce the law of nature.23 
Lastly, for Rousseau, the social contract arises whereby individuals give up some of their rights 
to the general will. According to Rousseau, the original freedom, happiness, equality and 
liberty which existed in primitive societies prior to the social contract was lost in the modern 
civilisation. The state was a new form of social organization that was formed to assure and 
guarantee rights, liberties freedom and equality.24 
The applicability of this theory to this study would be based on the fact that the police, being 
state actors, by committing extrajudicial killings are violating the social contract. The police 
are agents of the government, which would then mean that they are bound by the social contract 
that the citizens entered into with the government. Citizens have given up their rights to the 
state for collective security. Moreover, the power that the police have is held in public trust. 
Carrying out an extrajudicial killing and not being held accountable for it would be a grave 
violation of this public trust. It can be argued that one of the reasons for the existence of the 
oversight bodies is to ensure that the social contract is not violated. 
2.3 Deterrence Theory 
The deterrence theory is a theory of punishment whereby one is punished in order to deter 
themselves and other members of society committing the same crime. It lends itself to the 
prevention and control of a person's actions and behaviors through fear and threat that there 
will be consequences for the person's undesired or unlawful conduct.25 
For Thomas Hobbes, this is in relation to the social contract theory. By giving up some rights, 
individuals are making themselves part of the social contract. There are two important aspects 
of the contract, the rules by which each person must abide and the punishments for violating 
                                                          
22 Mouritz T, ‘Comparing the social contracts of Hobbes and Locke’ Volume 1 The West Australian Jurist, 2010, 
126. 
23 ‘Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’, 4. 
24 ‘Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’, 5. 
25 Barela P, ‘Understanding the effects of body worn cameras on police interactions with the public: Impact on 
number of assaults on officers and use of force complaints against officers’ Published LLM Thesis, University of 




those rules.26 There is a difference between the effects of the threat of punishment, which is 
general deterrence, and the effect of the imposition of punishment, which is special 
deterrence.27 Oversight would serve as a general deterrent, in that the threat of punishment 
which could be imposed if an officer is found guilty of committing an extrajudicial killing 
would stop them from doing it. Oversight would also act as a special deterrent in a case where 
a police officer is found guilty of perpetrating an extrajudicial killing. Once an officer is 
imprisoned for an extrajudicial killing, in the event that they are released, that imprisonment 
would deter them from committing another extrajudicial killing. 
In this case, the police perpetuating extrajudicial killings is a violation of the rules set when 
citizens and the state entered into the social contract and the oversight bodies are supposed to 
start the journey to the punishment for such actions. Such punishment or the threat of the same 
would deter the perpetrator of the extrajudicial killing as well as other police officers from 
such misconduct. 
For the deterrence theory, the existence of a legal framework that prescribes the steps to be 
taken after such an action and the consequences of the violation of what is required of the 
police should dissuade them from misconduct, in this case, extrajudicial killings. Moreover, 
the existence of a properly functional oversight body would further the aim of deterring police 
officers from such conduct. 
2.4 The Normative Human Rights Framework 
2.4.1 International Instruments 
There exists a human rights framework that sets standards which would then guide police 
accountability and oversight, whether it is through internal mechanisms or external ones, such 
as civilian oversight. The framework is in the form of the rights that are ought to be protected 
by the state as well as standards that have been set by international organizations for law 
enforcement, including those for the use of firearms. 
                                                          
26 Marshall C, ‘Deterrence theory’ Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, 2002, 512 —< 
http://faculty.washington.edu/matsueda/courses/371/Readings/Deterrence.pdf> on 2 September 2017. 





The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that State Parties shall ensure 
that any person whose rights or freedoms granted by the Covenant have been violated has 
effective remedy. This is notwithstanding the fact that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity. State Parties ought to ensure that any person claiming 
such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of 
the State, and develop the possibilities of judicial remedy, and that the competent authorities 
shall enforce such remedies when granted.28 Extrajudicial killings are a violation of the right 
to life and the state, regardless of the fact that they are committed by its agents, ought to protect 
its citizens. 
The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials is an important set of principles for 
accountable policing. It not only sets out general standards of behaviour for police officials but 
also specifies in Article 8 that any violation of the Code shall be reported to the superior 
authorities and, if necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing 
or remedial power.29 Article 3 also stipulates that law enforcement officials may use force only 
when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty. The use 
of firearms is considered to be an extreme measure, with every effort being made to exclude 
their use.30 In the General Assembly Resolution adopting the Code of Conduct, it is 
acknowledged that every law enforcement agency should be representative of and responsive 
and accountable to the community as a whole.31 It is clear that any use of force that exceeds 
the limits set out in the Code of Conduct would be unlawful and therefore, the officer ought to 
be held liable for the same. 
Moreover, in the Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, it is stated that an effective mechanism should be created to ensure 
internal discipline, external control and supervision of law enforcement officials. This 
                                                          
28 Article 2, International covenant on civil and political rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
29 UNGA, Code of conduct for law enforcement officials, UN A/RES/34/169 Annex 5 February 1980. 
30 UNGA, Code of conduct for law enforcement officials. 




mechanism should be authorised to receive complaints from the public with the existence of 
such provisions being made known to the public.32 
The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials establish 
rules for the reporting and review of incidents when death or serious injury occurs as a result 
of the use of force and firearms, and whenever a firearm is used in the course of duty.33 
Principle 6 states that where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials, they ought to report the incident promptly to their superiors.34 Principle 
22 provides that governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that an effective 
review process is available and that independent administrative or prosecutorial authorities are 
in a position to exercise jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. In case of death or serious 
injury, a detailed report has to be sent to the competent authorities responsible for 
administrative review and judicial control.35 
Principle 23 adds that persons affected by the use of force and firearms, or their legal 
representatives, shall have access to an independent process, including a judicial process.36 
Principle 24 provides that in case there has been an unlawful use of a firearm, the government 
and law enforcement agencies should ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they 
know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are 
resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all 
measures in their power to prevent, suppress or report such use.37 These principles provide a 
framework that the authority which is reviewing the use of firearms, be it the judiciary or an 
oversight body, should follow. 
The 2016 Minnesota Protocol on Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death came into force 
in 2017 replacing Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, 
Arbitrary and Summary Executions. It states that protection of the right to life means 
                                                          
32 ECOSOC Resolution 1989/61, Guidelines for the effective implementation of the code of conduct for law 
enforcement officials, 24 May 1989. 
33 Amnesty International, Police Oversight, 2015, 9. 
34 Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials (hereafter the Basic principles 
on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials), Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27 August to 7 September 1990. 
35 Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, 27 August to 7 September 1990. 
36 Basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, 27 August to 7 September 1990. 




preventing the arbitrary deprivation of life, including through an appropriate framework of 
laws, regulations, precautions and procedures. It also requires accountability for the arbitrary 
deprivation of life whenever it occurs.38 It adds that the duty to investigate any potentially 
unlawful death includes all cases where the State has caused a death or where it is alleged or 
suspected that the State caused a death (for example, where law enforcement officers used 
force that may have contributed to the death).39 
The Protocol also gives elements of the duty to investigate which based on international law 
are that investigations should be prompt; effective and thorough; independent and impartial; 
and transparent. Being prompt means that the investigation should be conducted as soon as 
possible from the time of occurrence of the death and proceed without unreasonable delay.40 
As for the requirement for the investigation to be effective and thorough, investigations ought 
to seek to identify not only direct perpetrators but also all others who were responsible for the 
death an example being officials in the chain of command who were complicit in the death. 
Being effective and thorough entails the capability of the investigations to ensure 
accountability for unlawful death and where it is justified, prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible for those killings thus preventing future unlawful death. It would also entail the 
investigation being carried out in a manner that is in accordance with good practice.41 
The investigative mechanism entrusted to conduct the investigation must be adequately 
empowered to do so. Minimum standards for such a mechanism include having the legal power 
to compel witnesses and require the production of evidence, having sufficient financial and 
human resources, which would qualified investigators and relevant experts. Any investigative 
mechanism must also be able to ensure the safety and security of witnesses, including, where 
necessary, through an effective witness protection programme.42 
                                                          
38 The Minnesota protocol on the investigation of potentially unlawful death (2016): The revised United Nations 
manual on the effective prevention and investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions (hereafter 
The Minnesota protocol on the investigation of potentially unlawful death), Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017, 3. 
39 The Minnesota protocol on the investigation of potentially unlawful death (2016), 5. 
40 The Minnesota protocol on the investigation of potentially unlawful death (2016), 7. 
41 The Minnesota protocol on the investigation of potentially unlawful death (2016), 7. 




For independence and impartiality, investigators and investigative mechanisms must be, and 
must be seen to be, independent of any undue influence. They must be independent 
institutionally and formally, as well as in practice and perception, at all stages. Lastly, for 
transparency, States should, at a minimum, be transparent about the existence of an 
investigation, the procedures to be followed in an investigation, and an investigation’s findings, 
including their factual and legal basis.43 
2.4.2 Regional Instruments 
In General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the right 
to life (Article 4), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that the failure 
of the State transparently to take all necessary measures to investigate suspicious deaths and 
all killings by State agents and to identify and hold accountable individuals or groups 
responsible for violations of the right to life constitutes in itself a violation by the State of that 
right.44 It also adds that accountability requires investigation and, where appropriate criminal 
prosecution.45 
In the Resolution on Police Reform, Accountability and Civilian Police Oversight in Africa, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights urges State Parties to the African 
Charter, in Article 3, to establish independent civilian policing oversight mechanisms which 
shall include civilian participation.46 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN KENYA GOVERNING 
POLICE OVERSIGHT 
3.1 Introduction 
In as much as there is an international and regional framework for police oversight, it is 
important to look at the Kenyan framework to establish whether such provisions have been 
covered in our legislation. These include laws relating to police accountability, oversight and 
the use of firearms as well as the human rights framework. 
3.2 Constitutional Framework 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 is a manifestation of the social contract between the people 
of Kenya and the government. Article 1 (1) states that all sovereign power belongs to the people 
of Kenya and shall be exercised only in accordance with this Constitution.47 Article 1 (2) adds 
that the people may exercise their sovereign power either directly or through their 
democratically elected representatives.48 One of the basic tenets of the social contract is that 
citizens give up some of their rights to the state in order to have other rights protected by the 
State. Article 1 is a manifestation of the existence of a social contract between the citizens and 
the government of Kenya. There exists an extensive rights regime under Chapter 4 of the 
Constitution. Article 20 (1) states that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds all State 
organs and all persons.49 The right to life is among these rights with Article 26 (3) stating that 
a person shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorised by this 
Constitution or other written law.50 
All these provisions show the integral nature of the right to life in a society and that the police 
would be required to respect it. Extrajudicial killings committed by the police are therefore a 
grave violation of this right, especially because the police are agents of the state, and the state 
has a responsibility to protect its citizens’ rights, meaning that the state would not be absolved 
from liability. In as much as the state is required to ensure that police officers adhere to the 
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legal requirements that have been set for their conduct, in the event that the police act in a 
manner contrary to them, the state still has a responsibility to hold them accountable for their 
actions. The responsibility of the state is envisioned under Article 21 (1) which provides that 
the state and every state organ have a fundamental duty to observe, respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights.51 
The Constitution establishes the National Police Service (NPS) as a national security organ 
under Article 239 and 243. Under Article 238 (2), one of the principles of national security is 
that it should be pursued in compliance with the law and with utmost respect for the rule of 
law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms.52 Article 244 of the Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010 requires the police to strive for the highest standards of professionalism and 
discipline among its members as well as to prevent corruption and promote and practise 
transparency and accountability while carrying out their duties.53 They are also required to 
comply with constitutional standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms.54 
It should be noted that although the Constitution states all this, Article 239 (5) states that 
national security organs are subordinate to civilian authority.55 This is an important provision 
as it gives legitimacy to the establishment of a civilian oversight body for the police. It shows 
that despite the fact that as there is a robust human rights framework as well as principles and 
objects guiding the police, they cannot operate in a vacuum. 
There are other institutions which are established under the Constitution which due to their 
mandate, can exercise oversight over the police. Such an institution is the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights which is established pursuant to Article 59 (4) of the 
Constitution of Kenya. Among its functions, the most relevant to police oversight is that it is 
to promote the protection and observance of human rights in public and private institutions as 
well as monitoring, investigating and reporting on the observance of human rights  in all 
spheres in the Republic, including observance by the national security organs.56 The 
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Commission can also receive and investigate complaints about alleged abuses of human 
rights.57 It is an independent commission.58 The link between the functions of this Commission 
and police oversight mechanisms over extrajudicial killings arises from the fact that they are a 
violation of the right to life. 
3.3 The Statutory Framework 
Section 41 of the National Police Service Act provides for the establishment of County 
Policing Authorities for each county. Some of the functions of these authorities include 
ensuring police accountability to the public and ensuring compliance with national policing 
standards.59 This ensures that although the Police Service is a national security organ, there is 
an additional level at which they can be held accountable for their actions, which is the county 
level. These authorities report to the Inspector-General, Cabinet Secretary, County Assembly 
and Governor of the respective county.60 
Section 87 of the National Police Service Act establishes the IAU which is supposed to receive 
and investigate complaints against the police. The Unit has the power to investigate complaints 
from members of the Service or those of the public; at the direction of a senior officer; on its 
own initiative; on the direction of the Inspector General or; at the request of IPOA.61 The only 
independence that can be inferred from the rest of the Service is from the fact that the Unit is 
to be located in separate offices from the rest of the Service.62 However, physical independence 
is not enough. There is also the fact that the Unit should not be subject to the control, direction 
or command of the Kenya Police, Administration Police or the Directorate.63 However, the law 
does not guarantee such operational independence. It states that the IAU should report directly 
to the Assistant Inspector-General who will subsequently report to the Inspector-General.64 
Additionally, in as much as the law provides that the unit should be located in separate offices 
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from the rest of the Service, their offices are currently at Jogoo House, which is where the 
offices of the Inspector-General and headquarters of the Administration Police are found. 
In relation to the use of force and firearms, the Sixth Schedule of the National Police Service 
Act stipulates conditions for their use. Paragraph 5 of Part A of the Sixth Schedule provides 
that any use of force that leads to death, serious injury and other grave consequences shall be 
reported immediately by the officer in charge or another direct superior of the person who 
caused the death or injury, to IPOA who shall investigate the case. Failure to report such 
conduct is considered a disciplinary offence.65 Paragraph 5 of Part B of the Sixth Schedule 
states that any use of firearms that leads to death, serious injury and other grave consequences 
shall be reported by the officer in charge or another direct superior of the person who caused 
the death or injury, to IPOA who shall investigate the case.66 Paragraph 1 of Part C of the Sixth 
Schedule gives superior officers the duty to prevent unlawful use of force and firearms, and in 
case such unlawful use occurs, they ought to report it to IPOA as well as the Inspector 
General.67 
In addition to the IAU, IPOA, established under the Independent Policing Oversight Authority 
Act and is aimed at holding the police accountable to the public in the performance of their 
functions by providing for civilian oversight.68 This gives effect to Article 239 (5) on the 
subordinate nature of national security organs, in this case, the NPS, to civilian authority. The 
Authority is also supposed to give effect to Article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya, in that 
the police should strive for professionalism and discipline as well as promotion and practicing 
transparency and accountability.69 In addition, the Authority is also supposed to ensure 
independent oversight of the handling of complaints by the Service.70 
How then would extrajudicial killings fall within the realm of complaints that IPOA can 
handle? Section 2 states that misconduct means any action, or failure or refusal to act, which 
although it may not necessarily constitute a contravention of law, does not meet the 
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requirements or norms of policing contained in any regulation or official document, charter, 
standing orders or policy providing for rules on the use or abuse of power or rules and 
regulations on the use of equipment, applicable to members of the Service.71 
This definition is applicable to extrajudicial killings due the fact that they go against the 
constitutional requirements for policing and the requirements for use of firearms in which will 
have been provided for in the National Police Service Act. Extrajudicial killings are a 
contravention of the law and they constitute a criminal offence as opposed to being viewed as 
mere misconduct. Section 4 of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act provides that 
the Authority established is independent, not being subject to any person, office or authority.72 
The importance of this independence will be seen in Chapter 4. 
It is also important to look at the functions and powers of the Authority in order to see what 
they can and cannot do. The functions are provided for in Section 6 of the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority Act. One of the functions includes investigation of any complaints related 
to criminal offences committed by any member of the service whether on its own motion or on 
receipt of a complaint, and making recommendations to the relevant authorities, including 
recommendations for prosecution, compensation, internal disciplinary action or any other 
appropriate relief.73 
The Authority also receives and investigates complaints by members of the Service.74 This is 
important because a complaint about an extrajudicial killing can come either from a member 
of society or from a police officer who is aware about commission of the same. For police, it 
would also be important because they would not have to worry about the consequences that 
they could suffer in case they report an incident to their superiors. 
They should also investigate and monitor policing operations which would affect members of 
the public.75 Lastly, they are tasked with monitoring, reviewing and auditing investigations and 
actions taken by the IAU of the Service in response to complaints against the police and keep 
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a record of all such complaints regardless of where they have been first reported and what 
action has been taken.76    
While the authority has all these functions, are their powers sufficient enough for them to 
exercise their mandate? Section 7 of the Act provides for the powers of the Authority. One of 
the powers is investigation of the Service on its own motion or on receipt of complaints from 
members of the public, and for this purpose, it can gather any information that it considers 
necessary by such lawful means as it may deem appropriate.77 
Some of the ways the Authority is allowed to gather information include investigating any 
death that has occurred or is suspected to have occurred as a result of police action; 
recommending to the DPP the prosecution of a person for any offence; requisition of 
information from the Service; search and seizure as well as interviewing and taking statements 
from individuals under oath of affirmation.78  
The Authority also has the power to take over ongoing internal investigations into misconduct 
or failure to comply with any law if such investigations are inordinately delayed or manifestly 
unreasonable.79 This power is also provided for in Section 87 (5) of the National Police Service 
Act. This power is important because there are possibilities that the IAU is not adequately 
discharging its mandate which can result in officers not being held liable for their actions. 
The Authority does not have any prosecutorial powers upon the completion of an investigation. 
Section 29 provides for the steps after investigations. One of these steps include recommending 
the prosecution of a member of the Service to the DPP where the inquiry, in their opinion, 
discloses a criminal act by that member.80 The other steps are that where an inquiry discloses 
negligence in the performance of duty by a member of the Service, the Authority could 
recommend that disciplinary action be taken against that member.81 The Authority could also 
recommend that a complainant take any other course of action suitable in the circumstances.82 
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This will be important in order to establish whether the Authority would require prosecutorial 
powers in order to effectively discharge their mandate while exercising oversight over the 
police on issues of extrajudicial killings.  
3.4 Conclusion 
There is a robust legal framework which provides for and necessitates police oversight over 
extrajudicial killings. These range from a vast human rights framework to the establishment of 
institutions that are supposed to exercise oversight over the Service at different levels. Kenya 
therefore adopts a model where there is both internal and external oversight of the NPS. These 
institutions ought to ensure that the police are held accountable for their actions, although 






CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND 
THEIR INVESTIGATION IN KENYA 
4.1 Introduction 
Prior to police reform, there were no oversight institutions that dealt with the Police Force. 
With the police reforms, various institutions have been established and even with such 
institutions, extrajudicial killings are still ongoing, with the police rarely being held liable for 
their actions. This chapter will look at the situation pre and post police reforms, assessing 
whether there are factors that could be affecting the investigation of extrajudicial killings in 
Kenya. 
4.2 Before Police Reform (Between 2007 and 2010) 
Before the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the police service was divided into 
two: the Kenya Police Force established under the Police Act and the Administration Police 
Force which was established under the Administration Police Act.83 Under both legislations, 
there was no established oversight body, whether external or internal. The fact that the police 
force functioned as two units gave the executive arm of government a chance to exercise 
political control over the police force which operated as a department under the Office of the 
President. While the general mandates of the regular and administration police officers were 
identical, they differed in their core purpose – the former was primarily designed for crime 
prevention and detection, while the latter mainly focused on securing government officials and 
assets.84 The report also points out that the impunity for human rights violations committed by 
the police continued because of the lack of accountability faced by officers for acts in violation 
of the law.85 The fact that the police would not be prosecuted for their actions was also a 
challenge for accountability. 
The disputed 2007 General Election led to post-election violence. This resulted in a lot of 
deaths, 405 of which were as a result of gunshot wounds, representing 37.5% of the total 
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number of deaths that had occurred during this period.86 The Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election Violence found that the police were responsible for all cases of shooting since no 
evidence to the contrary was ever shown. The Commission gave recommendations for the 
Police. These included a comprehensive reform of both the Kenya Police Service and the 
Administration Police Service as well as the establishment of an Independent Police Conduct 
Authority.87 The killings that took place in the course of post-election violence fall under 
extrajudicial killings and the report shows that there were no oversight mechanisms that dealt 
with the police at that point time. The report also recommended that the government should 
establish a special tribunal to investigate individuals suspected of such violence.88 However, 
no local tribunal was established. 
There was compelling evidence that the police responded, more often than not, with unlawful 
force, resulting in killing, rather than arresting suspects. Investigations by police were so 
deficient and compromised that claims by the police that all killings are lawful were inherently 
unreliable and unsustainable.89 This study intends to show that the involvement of police in 
the killings, even with the legal obligation to report any death that results from the use of their 
firearms cannot be deemed to be an efficient mechanism, as the oversight authority would be 
highly reliant on the police themselves, who in turn would not be willing to incriminate 
themselves. 
In the 2009 Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms, it is pointed out that there 
was an internal complaints mechanism that had been provided for in the Kenya Police Standing 
Orders. This mechanism was supposed to deal with complaints from the public and those from 
police officers. However, complaints received had little, if any success. The Report points out 
a need for an internal enforcement mechanism to deal with complaints against the police.90 The 
Report then deals with the issue of external accountability. It states that the police have powers, 
which if not held accountable for, would lead to abuse of their powers and pave way for police 
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misconduct.91 There was no institution, at that point, which had its mandate solely being police 
oversight.92 It was noted that one of the factors that necessitated the establishment of an 
external oversight body was the fact there had been complaints, which included, but were not 
limited to the use of excessive force including extrajudicial executions.93 
4.3 After Police Reforms (2010 to Present) 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 necessitated police reforms. One of the changes that came 
with the police reforms was the restructuring of the Police Service and the establishment of an 
external oversight mechanism. This was made possible by the enactment of the statutes 
covered in Chapter 3 (the National Police Service Act and the Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority Act). The restructuring of the Police Service was a recommendation of both the 
Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence and the National Task Force on Police 
Reforms. This restructuring brought the Kenya Police and Administration police under the 
command of the Inspector-General.  An organogram of the current structure of the Service can 
be seen below. 
‘
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With the IAU being an internal oversight mechanism, it is hard to determine whether they are 
independent of any influence from the Police Service. It is different to the earlier complaints 
desks in that it is established clearly as a separate unit in the legislation, with separate and 
stronger powers and functions.94 The only independence that we are aware of is the fact that 
their offices ought to be separate from the rest of the service.95 There have been no reports 
issued by the IAU which makes it difficult to know the number of complaints they have 
received as well as the investigations they have conducted. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
IAU reports to the Assistant Inspector-General who subsequently reports to the Inspector 
General.96 
The IAU has taken too long to be operationalized and this has placed a huge responsibility on 
IPOA, which currently handles a large number of cases that would have otherwise been 
handled with the Unit.97 Incidents of deaths arising from police action or inaction have 
remained high among the complaints received by the Authority. The Authority has plans to 
gradually hand over other categories of complaints to IAU so as to fully concentrate its 
resources on the most serious categories of deaths and injuries caused by police action or 
inaction.98 However, these categories have not been provided for. This is relevant to the study 
as it shows the necessity of coordination between the internal and external oversight bodies for 
there to be resolution of cases of extrajudicial killings, as the police would be held accountable, 
thus leading to reduction of the same.  
Failure to gather evidence that would result in convictions is one of the factors that motivates 
security agencies, which include the police service, to resort to extrajudicial killings.99 
Although a number of individuals and organisations had complained about or reported cases 
of extra judicial executions to the relevant authorities, no serious investigations had never been 
conducted and no single police officer or security agent had been prosecuted for their role or 
                                                          
94 Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) and African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum 
(APCOF), Local policing accountability in Kenya: Challenges and opportunities, 2014, 9. 
95 Section 87(7), National Police Service Act (Act No. 11A of 2011). 
96 Section 87(9), National Police Service Act (Act No. 11A of 2011). 
97 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Centre for Human Rights and Peace (The University of 
Nairobi), Audit of the status of police reforms in Kenya, 2015, 33. 
98 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Centre for Human Rights and Peace (The University of 
Nairobi), Audit of the status of police reforms in Kenya, 2015, 33. 




involvement in extrajudicial executions as of 2014.100 The extent to which the IAU had 
delivered on its mandate remained doubtful as the levels of internal accountability within the 
service were still very low.101 Both internal and external police accountability have not 
improved despite the existence of IPOA.102 With complaints of extrajudicial killings still being 
reported in the name of fighting criminality as well as human rights violations, this points to 
the fact that the Authority needs to do more to ensure that the culture of accountability is 
entrenched in policing.103 
A 2016 report titled ‘What Do We Tell The Families’ by Haki Africa, a Non-Governmental 
Organisation outlines 31 cases of extrajudicial killings, which were carried out by individuals 
recognisable as police or members of Kenyan security, or by unidentified, non-uniformed 
individuals.104 It is also stated that where the killings were reportedly conducted by 
unidentified individuals, the possibility remains that they have been carried out by a proxy 
rather than police officers or government agents proper.105 This reiterates the position that 
despite the existence of oversight mechanisms, extrajudicial killings are still ongoing, showing 
that there is a gap in how their mandate is being exercised. 
The Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) has also published various reports detailing 
extrajudicial killings. In 2015, they documented 126 police killings, with 97 being summary 
executions, 20 being people who were killed to protect life and 7 resulting from unclear 
circumstances.106 In 2016, there were 144 police killings, 122 being summary executions, 6 
being killed to protect life and 16 resulting from unclear circumstances.107 Between January 
and March 2017, there were 60 police killings, 33 being summary executions, 14 being killed 
to protect life and 13 resulting from unclear circumstances.108 These killings having occurred 
after the establishment of the oversight mechanisms show that there has been no change in 
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police conduct, with extrajudicial killings still being rampant and police not being held 
accountable. 
IPOA Reports, which are published biannually, document the nature of complaints that the 
Authority receives during the given period. Between January and June 2013, there were 2 cases 
of unlawful killings which were being investigated.109 Between July and December 2013, there 
were 22 cases which were investigated, 9 being complaints on unlawful killings.110 One of the 
challenges that was pointed out in that report was the fact that the Authority was experiencing 
and foresaw lack of cooperation from the police when it came to investigations. The report 
also stated that there had been difficulties in concluding some investigations due to interference 
of evidence by suspected police officers.111  
Between January and June 2014, there were 123 cases which were investigated, with 62 being 
deaths which arose from police action or inaction.112 During this period, the Authority faced 
various challenges. These included budget constraints, failure of other institutions to cooperate, 
hampering of evidence and inadequate staffing.113 Between July and December 2014, there 
were 54 cases which were investigated, with 9 being cases of death which arose from police 
action or inaction.114 In relation to unlawful killings, the Authority faced several challenges 
including contamination of evidence, manhandling of exhibits, and inconclusive forensic 
evidence due to flawed recording, collection and preservation of such evidence. All these 
challenges led to suspects not being identified.115 Other challenges included under-funding, 
inadequate number of investigators and inadequate cooperation from some police 
commanders.116 
Between January and June 2015, there were 83 cases which were investigated, with 26 cases 
being deaths which arose from police action or inaction.117 The challenges faced were similar 
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to those pointed out in previous years, including the lack of an independent ballistic or forensic 
services provider, which meant that the Authority had to rely on the Police Ballistics 
Laboratory.118 Between July and December 2015, the Authority did not give a breakdown of 
the nature of cases that they had investigated. However, it pointed out that it received 1,203 
complaints, with 53 being complaints of police shootings.119 During this period, only 63 
investigations were completed.120 One of the challenges that was faced during this period was 
the delay of processing of complaints that were referred to the IAU.121 
Between January and June 2016, the Authority received 1,326 complaints, with 117 being 
complaints of police shootings and deaths.122 Out of this number, only 94 cases were 
investigated.123 One of the challenges that the Authority faced was that its services were 
inaccessible due to its centralized locality.124 Between July and December 2016, 37 cases of 
death resulting from police actions or inactions were investigated.125 Some of the challenges 
that the Authority faced were reduced cooperation from the National Police Service which 
hindered execution of the Authority’s mandate as well as reduction of the government’s budget 
allocation which constrained operations.126 
Another challenge that IPOA has faced, although it has not been documented in the reports, is 
that of parliamentary interference. In 2015, Parliament sought to amend the Independent 
Policing Oversight Authority Act in order to give the President power to remove the 
chairperson of the board whenever he deemed it necessary, without the procedure of receiving 
a recommendation from a tribunal before removing a member of the Authority.127 In 2016, 
Parliament sought to amend the same Act to provide for confidentiality of documents or other 
information produced by serving or retired police officers summoned to appear before the 
Authority.128  
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There have been a number of extrajudicial killings which have caused public unrest. One of 
these killings is that of Aboud Rogo in 2012. Rogo, who was on sanctions lists by the United 
States and United Nation for allegedly supporting Somalia’s Al-Qaeda-linked Shabaab 
militants, was killed when unidentified gunmen opened fire on his vehicle as he was driving 
with his wife and children, sparking furious protests.129 In this case, IPOA stated that it was 
invited to participate in the investigations but did not meaningfully do so because it lacked 
internal investigative capacity and also did not have control over the whole investigation 
process.130 
A more recent case is that of Willie Kimani. He disappeared after lodging a complaint on 
behalf of a client, who was also killed, along with their driver. The Law Society of Kenya 
called on all lawyers to boycott courts with nationwide protests being organised.131 Hundreds 
of people marched to protest against their apparent extrajudicial killings with demonstrators 
carrying a mock coffin emblazoned with the words “stop extrajudicial killings”. Others wore 
T-shirts bearing the slogan “stop police executions”.132 It is this public outcry that can be seen 
to have led to the investigation of those killings. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Looking at these reports, it is evident that even with the existence of an internal oversight 
mechanism as well as an independent oversight body and various reports of extrajudicial 
killings, there has been no change in the occurrence of such killings and the police are not 
being held accountable for their conduct. These internal and external oversight bodies are not 
hampered by lack of law but by operational constraints. With the challenges that have been 
detailed by the Authority over the years, it is clear that things such as the fact that the police 
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are involved in such killings as well as lack of effective cooperation with the established 

























CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
Having looked at international standards, domestic standards and the current situation on the 
oversight mechanisms on unlawful police action with regard to extrajudicial killings in Kenya, 
it is clear that there needs to be some change in the current system. This chapter analyses the 
findings in the previous chapters to show why Kenya needs to improve its oversight 
mechanisms in order to ensure a reduction in the number of extrajudicial killings. 
5.2 Failure of accountability, investigation and proper law enforcement 
Accountability can be defined as a system of internal and external checks and balances aimed 
at ensuring that police carry out their duties properly and are held responsible if they fail to do 
so.133 That system ought to uphold police integrity and deter misconduct and to restore or 
enhance public confidence in policing. Police integrity refers to normative and other safeguards 
that keep police from misusing their powers and abusing their rights and privileges.134 
Accountable policing would mean that the police accept being questioned about their decisions 
and actions and accept the consequences of being found guilty of misconduct, including 
sanctions and having to compensate victims.135 
Law enforcement agencies should be subjected to appropriate control and oversight of their 
compliance with the legal and operational framework that governs their functioning and be 
held accountable for the fulfilment of their duties, including with regards to their use of 
force.136 Effective accountability would require a proper complaints system that is easily 
accessible to the public and that can effectively investigate allegations and recommend 
disciplinary sanctions or refer cases for criminal prosecution.137 It would involve identification 
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and punishment of those who have committed misconduct, and ensuring accountability after 
the act.138 At present, there is a complaints system which is accessible to the public, with 
citizens being allowed to make complaints by going to IPOA’s offices, online, by writing 
letters, through telephone calls. It is a mechanism that is also open to complaints from members 
of the Service. 
Moreover, effective accountability would also involve guidance for the police on what to do 
and how they ought to do it.139 This is generally referred to as accountability before the act.140 
This oversight role is the instruction, policy or legal requirement that is set before policing 
takes place.141 In relation to accountability before the act, there are no clear laws and policies 
on the use of force and firearms in Kenya. The instruments discussed in Chapter 2 are merely 
soft law, meaning they are not necessarily binding to the NPS even though they are legal 
standards. The National Police Service Act provides that the Cabinet Secretary is to make 
further regulations on the lawful use of force and use of firearms.142 To date, there are no such 
regulations. It is therefore difficult to ensure accountability before the act without a clear legal 
framework which ought to guide police actions. Furthermore, there is no publicly available 
code of conduct for the NPS that implements the legal standards that are stipulated in 
international law. 
Despite the number of complaints that IPOA receives annually, there are very few cases that 
end up being prosecuted in court. This means that they are not punished for the commission of 
such crimes, therefore, they continue to carry out their duties without being in accordance with 
the law. In the Kenyan context, we have seen that there has been failure of accountability, both 
before and after the fact. Moreover, with the requirement that each county ought to have a 
County Policing Authority, this could also help with ensuring accountability of the police to 
the members of the public at a decentralized level of government. More than six years since 
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the commencement date of the National Police Service Act, these Authorities are yet to be 
operationalised.143 
In relation to investigation, this would not only involve the oversight bodies but also the 
criminal justice system. The elements of the duty to investigate are that the investigation ought 
to be prompt; effective and thorough; independent and impartial; and transparent.144 As seen 
in the previous chapter, the investigations conducted by IPOA do not satisfy all of these 
elements, leading to inadequate investigation. The fact that there is a backlog in the complaints 
being investigated means that investigations are not prompt even after receipt of the complaints 
by IPOA. There are very few extrajudicial killings which have led to public uproar, such as 
that of Willie Kimani. However, even in this case, the investigative process has not been 
completed to date and the police officers responsible for his death have not been held liable to 
date as the proceedings are still ongoing. The law does not set out timelines for the amount of 
time that should be taken to conduct investigations. This could also be a contributing factor to 
the investigations not being prompt. 
The investigations conducted by IPOA fail to meet the element that investigations should be 
effective and thorough. This is because the investigations have not yet, so far, ensured 
accountability for the extrajudicial killings that have been committed. The investigations have 
not led to prevention of such killings from occurring. In fact, the number of killings have been 
increasing in some years. Ideally, if the oversight mechanisms were efficient, police officers 
would be deterred from committing extrajudicial killings, leading to a reduction in the number 
of deaths. 
Lastly, there is the issue of proper law enforcement. The mere fact that extrajudicial killings 
are being carried out by the police, and they still continue to happen shows that there is 
systemic failure.  For proper law enforcement to exist, there are various things that would have 
to exist in addition to oversight mechanisms. There would need to be a clear set of rules and 
guidelines that the police ought to follow and that they can be held accountable for if they do 
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not. Presently, there are no set standards in Kenyan law that would guide police on the use of 
the firearms. It would be very easy for the police to justify their use of firearms as being within 
the grounds set out in the Sixth Schedule of the National Police Service Act, an example being 
that the use of firearms was as a measure of self-defence. 
Establishing a system that reinforces compliance with international human rights obligations 
and promotes standards and norms on crime prevention and criminal justice as well as 
international good practices requires not only an adequate legal and operational framework but 
also the political will, the resources and institutions to implement and act accordingly.145 In 
order to mitigate this systemic failure, it would be important for the oversight mechanisms that 
have been created under the law to regulate police conduct. It would also be necessary for the 
international human rights standards which are just guidelines at this point to be legislated. 
5.3 Widespread nature of extrajudicial killings and police involvement in investigation 
As has been shown, there is an issue of extrajudicial killings being widespread. This is in 
respect to the number of killings as well as the number of places that the killings occur. The 
number of killings that are reported tend to be high, with the highest having been 117 between 
January and June 2016.146 The reports by IMLU also show that the killings occur in various 
counties, with the latest report detailing killings in 9 out of the 47 counties.147 This is a problem 
because IPOA only has offices in Nairobi, Kisumu, Garissa and Mombasa.148 It is necessary 
to further decentralise the services of the Authority to the remaining counties to ensure that 
their investigations are more effective.  
From the previous chapters, it has been clear that the police are involved at various stages from 
commission of the act to it investigation. The police are not only perpetrators of the killings, 
they are also relied upon during the investigation of the killings, for example, the use of the 
police ballistics laboratory. There were also various complaints of the police delaying 
responses to requests for information as well as contamination of evidence which would be 
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necessary for the Authority to conduct their investigations. It is clear that the fact that the police 
are involved in the operations of the Authority is a hindrance to the investigation of the killings. 
This also brings up the issue of the independence of the oversight mechanisms from the NPS. 
In order to be ‘independent’, there must be ‘practical independence’ and a ‘lack of hierarchical 
or institutional connection’ between investigators and those implicated in abuses.149 Therefore, 
there must be both independence in law and in fact. Investigators may not rely entirely or 
heavily on information provided by those implicated in abuses.150 Moreover, the 
‘investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective, and impartial analysis of 
all relevant elements’.151 This would mean that the oversight bodies ought not to rely too much 
on the police while conducting their investigations. It would also mean that when it comes to 
the IAU, it would be important to ensure that they are located separately from the rest of the 
Service in order to partially guarantee their independence and comply with the National Police 
Service Act. 
Police involvement also becomes an issue when it comes to compliance with the law. They are 
required to give IPOA details of any killings or serious injury within 24 hours of their 
occurrence. IPOA has stated that the number of deaths reported by the NPS is not reflective of 
the number of deaths as a result of police actions that were received through other channels, 
implying non-compliance by the NPS.152 This is because it is difficult to assume that police 
will want to be held liable for their actions, knowing that they would then end up being 
prosecuted and punished. The requirement that superior officers should report any unlawful 
use of force and firearms is also not met. An example can be drawn from the July to December 
2016 report whereby out of the 35 death complaints that the Authority received, only 3 were 
from a police station.153 This hinders investigation in that the oversight authorities would not 
have sufficient information while conducting an investigation. 
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5.4 Mandate and resources of the Authority 
Mandates need to be realistic and fair, and powers and resources must be adequate to fulfil 
those mandates.154 The Authority has as clear mandate which is set out under Section 6 of the 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act. The powers are limited to conducting 
investigations but the Authority does not have any prosecutorial powers. Whether or not a 
matter is to be prosecuted is at the discretion of the DPP. This could be seen as an issue because 
very few matters out of the ones reported to IPOA end up getting prosecuted, meaning that 
those liable for the extrajudicial killings would not be prosecuted or punished. 
It is important to consider whether the Authority should have the power to initiate proceedings 
without necessarily having to go through the Director of Public Prosecutions. This would not 
be a discretionary power, it would be dependent on the findings of the investigations that have 
been conducted and if an officer is found to have committed an offence, they would initiate 
proceedings, instead of having to wait for the DPP to determine whether or not the matter 
would be prosecuted. Having such a power would create a higher possibility that the police 
officers who have committed extrajudicial killings would be held liable for their actions, thus 
deterring other officers from perpetrating them. 
There have also been instances where Parliament has attempted to interfere with the mandate 
of the Authority, which would affect the independence which is necessary for the Authority’s 
operation. These instances were covered in Chapter 4. These did not succeed due to the 
backlash that Parliament faced from the Authority itself as well as civil society.155 However, 
IPOA has faced a challenge in relation to resources, especially funding. The Authority has 
complained about the reduction in their budget allocation, most recently at the onset of the 
2016/2017 budget.156 This hinders the capacity of the Authority to investigate complaints. It is 
necessary for IPOA to have adequate monetary resources to enable effective execution of its 
mandate. 
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5.5 Enhanced co-ordination between internal and external oversight mechanisms 
From the analysis of the reports by IPOA in the previous chapter, it is clear that there has been 
very little cooperation between the Authority and the IAU. It is unwise to vest all authority 
over the police on any single body, regardless of whether that body represents the executive, 
or the community, or is an independent oversight body, since impartiality cannot be assured.157 
This justifies the existence of both internal and external oversight mechanisms. 
External oversight and accountability mechanisms act together with internal police 
mechanisms to monitor police performance and ensure it is in accordance with the law and 
professional standards, and to hold officers accountable where misconduct does occur.158 The 
mechanisms aim to prevent police abuse of powers and illegitimate interference in policing, 
thereby increasing police professionalism and integrity and improving public trust in the 
police.159 
Without external oversight mechanisms, police leaders could fail to investigate or punish 
misconduct, which could lead to ineffective internal control. There are several benefits of 
external oversight mechanisms. They may achieve greater impartiality (at least in the public’s 
view) in the investigation of serious allegations against police officers.160 Furthermore, they 
may be better placed to encourage police officers to give evidence against other officers, 
particularly against their supervisors.161 Nevertheless, external oversight mechanisms have to 
be complemented by internal control and oversight, because in a number of instances internal 
investigation mechanisms might have structural advantages such as a greater amount of 
resources, more available data (police archives; witness reports; police officer statements), and 
better knowledge of the police environment.162 
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There have been complaints by IPOA that the IAU delays in processing complaints that the 
Authority refers to them. With the Authority aiming at focusing on the investigation of deaths 
resulting from police actions or inactions, such delay can be detrimental. This is because the 
Authority ends up handling more cases than it ideally should. In their biannual reports, there 
have been several instances in which they have provided the number of backlog cases. In the 
July to December 2016 report, it is stated that backlog is an issue that the Authority has faced 
since its inception.163 Between January and June 2014, there were 179 complaints out of the 
281 received which were awaiting investigation, which made the backlog 64%.164 
Between July and December 2014, there were 429 complaints out of the 697 received which 
were awaiting investigation, which made the backlog 62%.165 Between January and June 2015, 
there were 540 complaints out of the 911 received which were awaiting investigation, which 
made the backlog 59%.166 Between July and December 2015, there were 767 complaints out 
of the 1927 received which were awaiting investigation, which made the backlog 40%.167 
These numbers show that backlog is a big challenge to the Authority. The police bear the prime 
responsibility for the integrity and overall performance of their force, and as a consequence 
they should continue to carry out internal investigations. This can also help to prevent external 
bodies from becoming overloaded with work, which may seriously jeopardize their 
effectiveness.168 
Extrajudicial killings are very sensitive, owing to the fact that they violate principles on use of 
firearms as well as fundamental rights such as the right to life. In the reports published by 
IPOA, it has been stated that the IAU is yet to become fully operational, with IPOA giving 
recommendations to ensure adequate staffing so as to increase its capacity. There are various 
reasons why internal oversight mechanisms need to be effective. Without a strong internal 
oversight system, it would be impossible to create a culture of accountability, discipline and 
laws within the police and external systems would be unable to secure the coo-operation that 
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they need from the police in order to take corrective action.169 It would therefore be important 
to ensure that the IAU is well established in order to ensure that a culture of accountability is 
fostered within the NPS, making it easier for IPOA to execute its mandate. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This analysis has shown why it is necessary for improvements to be made in relation to both 
the IAU and IPOA in order to ensure that there is effective oversight of extrajudicial killings. 
These improvements are required for some aspects of the law as well as in the operalisation of 














                                                          





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusion 
The social contract theory, the deterrence theory and the normative human rights framework 
have provided a foundation for this study. With the state having entered a social contract with 
its citizens and the police being state agents, it is clear that the perpetration of extrajudicial 
killings by the police is a violation of this contract. The state will then have an obligation to 
protect its citizens right to life from any violation that is not within the limits of the law. The 
oversight mechanisms would need to be effective in order to ensure that the social contract is 
not continually violated as has been the case since the establishment of the oversight bodies, 
therefore necessitating enhanced accountability of the National Police Service. 
The deterrence theory is also important because punishment or threat of punishment should 
prevent the perpetration of extrajudicial killings. However, as was shown in Chapter 4, even 
with the existence of the IAU and IPOA, extrajudicial killings are still rampant. This is an 
indicator that the police are not being deterred from committing extrajudicial killings. It is 
necessary for these institutions to be operating effectively in order for the police to know that 
there is a possibility of punishment for their conduct. 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 lays emphasis on the protection and promotion human 
rights. This makes the soft law covered under the normative human rights framework 
extremely relevant and persuasive in this study. This framework gives requirements for well-
established oversight mechanisms and throughout the study, it has been shown why it would 
be necessary for the oversight mechanisms in Kenya to be improved. These include the fact 
that state has an obligation to protect the right to life and in case the right is violated, the victim 
has an effective remedy. 
The framework also includes principles on the use of force and firearms which should guide 
law enforcement officials. It is important that these principles are included in Kenyan 
legislation in order for the state to meet its international obligations. The normative human 
rights framework also shows the importance of the National Police Service having a set code 
of conduct to guide their operations. It also shows why the oversight mechanisms would need 




The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 necessitated police reforms which led to an extensive 
human rights framework as well as the establishment of oversight bodies which had police 
oversight as their sole mandate. With these reforms, crimes such as extrajudicial killings would 
have been expected to reduce. This is because gives primacy to the recognition of human rights 
and their protection, including by national security organs such as the National Police Service. 
Based on the findings on the occurrences of extrajudicial killings, this is not the case. It is clear 
that there is a grave violation of rights and that the established oversight mechanisms are not 
adequately playing their role in ensuring that the police are held accountable for their actions. 
The findings prove the hypothesis that was given at the beginning of the study, that the legal 
framework and the institutions tasked with police oversight are weak, and that the existing 
police oversight system needs to improved in order to adequately address valid complaints of 
extrajudicial killings. This is because they show that there are various challenges, mostly 
operational ones, that are faced by the oversight bodies, especially IPOA, which in turn make 
them weaker than they ought to be in exercising their mandate. These challenges include the 
lack of cooperation by the National Police Service, interference by the police in investigations, 
delays by the IAU in processing complaints, parliamentary interference with both the mandate 
and the resources allocated to IPOA and the IAU not being operationally autonomous, among 
others. 
With all these challenges, I would propose both legal and operational changes in order to 
enhance police accountability in cases of extrajudicial killings, ensuring that there is no 
violation of the social contract, that the deterrence theory is effective and that the human rights 
framework, both internationally and locally, is promoted and protected. 
6.2 Recommendations 
There are various recommendations to improve the existent oversight mechanisms and ensure 
that there will be more effective oversight over extrajudicial killings based on this study. These 
are:- 




IPOA and the IAU ought to have timelines stipulated in law to ensure that their investigations 
are prompt. Parliament should bring in the stakeholders in order to provide a reasonable 
timeline. 
B. Drafting of a publicly available Code of Conduct for the NPS. 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010 recognises the applicability of international law in the 
country. This includes the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. There is currently 
no publicly available Code of Conduct for the National Police Service. I recommend that one 
be drafted, borrowing from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. 
C. Drafting of regulations on the use of force and firearms. 
The Sixth Schedule requires that the Cabinet Secretary drafts regulations on the use of firearms. 
However, it is my recommendation that the regulations be drafted on both the use of force and 
firearms to ensure clarity in the National Police Service in instances where they have no option 
but to resort to the use of force and firearms. 
D. Ensure that the IAU are given separate offices to guarantee their independence. 
With Section 87 of the National Police Service Act stating that the offices of the IAU should 
be located separately from the rest of the Service, I recommend that the Government takes 
steps to ensure that this is done. This would guarantee physical independence from the rest of 
the Service and assist in discharging their mandate. 
E. Establishment of an Independent Ballistics Laboratory 
Independence is a key requirement for IPOA. However, with IPOA currently has to rely on the 
Police Ballistics Laboratory to conduct their investigations, I recommend that an Independent 
Ballistics Laboratory is set up to guarantee and protect the independence of IPOA. 
F. Give the IAU a clear mandate. 
With IPOA intending to shift its focus to investigation of deaths which occur or are suspected 
to have occurred as a result of police action, it is necessary for the IAU to have a clear mandate 
on the complaints which they can investigate. Parliament should amend Section 87 of the 





G. Accessibility of IPOA’s services in all 47 counties. 
Currently, IPOA only has offices in 4 out of the 47 counties: Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and 
Garissa. I recommend that they open offices in the remaining counties to make their services 
more accessible to the people and to ensure that investigations are easier to conduct. 
H. Establishment of County Policing Authorities in all 47 counties. 
These Authorities ensure accountability of the police at a decentralized level. These Authorities 
should be established in all counties pursuant to Section 41 of the National Police Service Act 
and should also report to IPOA since they are supposed to monitor trends and patterns of crimes 
in their respective counties. 
I. Giving IPOA prosecutorial powers 
The Independent Oversight Policing Authority Act should be amended to grant IPOA 
prosecutorial powers upon the conclusion of their investigations. This could be done by 
establishing a Commission which could comprise of individuals who have served as judges 
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